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1 
Summary 
All competition analysis, including in the field of mergers, begins by defining the 
relevant market. Relevant market consists of the relevant product market and the 
relevant geographic market. Companies have large market shares under narrow 
market definitions, which indicate a high chance of successful anticompetitive 
effect. A broad market definition excludes that chance. Therefore, it is very im-
portant for effective competition in the market that the relevant market is defined 
as closely to the actual situation as possible. 
In sectors where innovation plays a major role, the definition of the relevant mar-
ket also takes into account the R&D efforts of the merging firms. One of the sec-
tors where R&D poles can be identified early on is the pharmaceutical sector.  
In order to be considered as a part of a market, the drugs must have reached the 
stage of clinical trials regardless of where these trials are being conducted. The 
test for defining the relevant product market definition regarding pipeline drugs 
differs depending on whether they compete with existing drugs or future products.  
It seems as the Commission examines pipeline drugs as close as possible to fin-
ished dose pharmaceutical, including following the recent trend of narrowing the 
definition. The Commission has begun to define future markets in relation to dif-
ferent modes of action and administration.  
The scope relevant market definition, when no products have been launched on 
the market yet, has an influence in assessing the merger’s effect on competition in 
innovation, which depends on the amount of R&D poles left on the market post-
merger. A product market consisting of only pipeline drugs is defined depending 
on the characteristics of the product and indications they will apply to in the fu-
ture. The Commission, again, will look at the intended therapeutic by reference to 
the mechanism of action of the drug. This approach for future products could po-
tentially be too stringent as future products could already be substitutable at a 
more general level and pipeline drugs have a low chance of ever being launched 
onto the market. 
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Abbreviations 
API Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient 
ATC Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
EphMRA European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association  
GSK GlaxoSmithKline plc. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
IMS Intercontinental Medical Statistics 
LGSC Low-grade serous carcinoma 
M&A Mergers and Acquisitions 
OTC Over-the-counter 
R&D Research and Development 
Rx Prescription only 
SIEC Significantly impeding effective competition 
SSNIP Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price 
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Abbrevations of legislation 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Merger Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 Janu-
ary 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings  
Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings  
Guidelines on Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements 
Market Definition Notice Commission Notice on the definition of relevant 
market for the purpose of Community competition 
law  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Innovation and market definition 
Innovation is a key concept in the pharmaceutical sector. While the R&D efforts 
require significant investments and are time-consuming, they can result in new 
treatments and care, which provide previously unimaginable benefits to patients. 
According to the Pharmaceutical Market Inquiry, innovation is an essential com-
ponent of a competitive market economy and therefore promoting it is a task of 
competition law.
1
 Innovation does not only create new markets or replace previ-
ous ones, but also happens on existing markets through the improvement of prod-
ucts.
2
  
A merger between parties in control of major innovation poles for future markets 
may impede competition in innovation and hinder the launch of new innovative 
products onto the market.
3
 While the objective of mergers in pharmaceutical sec-
tor could be to avoid or limit competition, the Commission has full trust in the 
scrutiny under the EU and national merger control rules to avoid any loss in inno-
vation.
4
 
The purpose of merger control is the identification and prevention of transactions 
which create or enhance market power and in doing so significantly impede effec-
tive competition in a substantial part of the common market (Significantly imped-
ing effective competition or SIEC).
5
 Market power is generally the ability of the 
                                                 
1
 European Commission, ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry. Final Report’ (Commission Staff Work-
ing Document, 2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf> 
accessed 5 April 2015,  
paras 8, 86 
2
 Josef Drexl ‘Anticompetitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting Com-
petition in Innovation without a Market’ 8(3) [2012] Journal of Competition Law & Economics 
513 
3
 Ibid 524 
4
 European Commission, para 1568 
5
 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purpose of Community competi-
tion law [1997] OJ C 372/5 (Relevant Market Notice), para 10; Robert O'Donoghue and Jorge 
Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Publishing 2013) 209, Ioannis Kok-
 
6 
merged firm or the firms remaining in the market post-merger to reduce the ability 
of competitors to function properly on the market. The possible existence of mar-
ket power is usually determined through market shares, the calculation of which 
presupposes the definition of a market and the identification of firms that partici-
pate in it.
6
 
‘Market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of competition 
between firms. It serves to establish the framework within which the competition 
policy is applied by the commission.’7 The concept of market definition originates 
from the USA and is an analytical tool which is used in merger cases to ascertain 
the degree of dominance within said market. A broad definition of the market 
leaves market participants with comparatively small market shares leading to low 
likelihood of effective anticompetitive behaviour.
8
 A too narrow market defini-
tion, on the other hand, discourages innovation.
9
 As regarding the geographic 
market on pipeline pharmaceuticals, the Commission has been consistent in argu-
ing that as R&D is global, the geographic scope of the market is global or at least 
EEA-wide.
10
 
Therefore, the calculation of market shares directly depends on market definition. 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, based on case law, consider that market shares 
of 50% or more may in essence be evidence of an existent dominant position, but 
the ability to influence the market despite the level of market shares needs to be 
taken into account. Even firms created by a merger with less than 40% can lead to 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Likewise, when the market 
share does not exceed 25%, there is an assumption of no anticompetitive effect on 
the market. Market shares are also used to measure concentration levels on the 
market through applying the HHI. The Commission is unlikely to find horizontal 
competition concerns in a market where the HHI is less than 1000. There is also a 
                                                                                                                                     
koris and Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2014) 6.01 
6
 Kokkoris and Shelanski 6.01 - 6.03 
7
 Relevent Market Notice, para. 2. 
8
 Kokkoris and Shelanski 6.03 - 6.04 
9
 Jacob Westin ‘Defining Relevant Market in the Pharmaceutical Sector in the Light of the Losec-
case – Just How Different is the Pharmaceutical Market?’ [2011] 32(2) ECLR 58 
10
 Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz (Case IV/M.737) Commission Decision [1996] OJ L201/1, para 51 
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low likelihood of competition concerns when no possible constraints listed in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines is present and:  
1) The post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 2000 and the change in the 
HHI is below 250, 
2) The post-merger HHI is above 2000, but the change in the HHI is below 
150 . 
One of the abovementioned constraints includes a situation where one or more 
merging parties are important innovators in ways not reflected in market shares. 
11
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, in the field of human health, the Commission 
groups markets according to thresholds of market shares as follows: 
Table 1: Groups in pharmaceutical market 
 Parties’ joint market share The increment 
Group 1 >35% >1% 
Group 2 >35% <1% 
Group 3 15-35%  
The Commission generally focuses its market investigation on markets belonging 
to Group 1 as the other two groups do not usually pose competition concerns.
 12
 
Unlike the assessment of dominance under Art.102 TFEU, the EU merger control 
assesses the existence of dominance ex ante, which means that it looks whether a 
notifiable transaction would lead to a SIEC-situation. Consequently, in addition to 
looking at whether there is existing evidence of a dominant position, the competi-
                                                 
11
 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5 (Horizontal Merger Guidelines), paras 
16-20 
12
 Teva/Cephalon (Case COMP/M.6258) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C 46/1, para 15; 
Teva/Ratiopharm (Case COMP M.5865) Commission decision [2010] OJ C7/5, paras 12-14; Ab-
bott/Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Case COMP/M.5661) Commission Decision [2010] OJ C89/1, paras 
50-52 
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tion authority also needs to assess whether the situation will continue to exist or 
arise as a result of the merger.
13
  
The evaluation of dominance-inducing effects is especially difficult in technology 
and research-based areas, such as the pharmaceutical industry, where the potential 
effects on future technologies and products require detailed assessment.
14
 The 
CJEU has found that the analysis in merger control requires great care as it does 
not entail the examination of past events, but rather attempts to predict whether 
future events are more or less likely to occur as a result of a merger.
15
 The evi-
dence used to define a relevant product market includes information of substitu-
tion in the recent past, quantitative tests, reasoned answers of customers and com-
petitors, customer preferences, barriers and switching costs, categorisation of cus-
tomers and price discrimination.
16
 
1.2 Research question 
The thesis aims to answer the question of how to define relevant product market 
concerning R&D poles in pharmaceutical sector mergers. 
1.3 Method and material 
The most prominent legal research is the legal doctrinal research under which 
belongs this thesis as well. The legal doctrinal or legal dogmatic research method 
aims to investigate what the law is in a particular area. This method entails the 
collection and analysis of a body of case law and relevant legislation. The sup-
porting material includes secondary sources, such as journal articles and commen-
taries on cases and legislation. 
The research is limited to EU merger control procedures, which belong under the 
competence of the European Commission. In order to achieve the aims set for the 
                                                 
13
 Sally Shorthose (ed), Guide to EU Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law (3
rd
 edn, Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2012) 8.68; Robert O'Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 
TFEU (Hart Publishing 2013) 209 
14
 Ibid 
15
 Case C–12/03P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, para 42 
16
 Relevant Market Notice, para 38-43 
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research, the main body of case law consists of European Commission decisions 
in the field of pharmaceutical mergers. To set the relevant legal background, the 
research also refers to EU secondary legislation, relevant Commission guidelines 
and other documents.  
1.4 Research limitations 
The pharmaceutical industry offers a large variety of different medicinal products 
from APIs to medical equipment, and products for the treatment of human or ani-
mal care. All these products lead by R&D belong to different markets,
17
 the dis-
cussion of which would become too broad a task. Hence, the research scope is 
limited to the European Commission merger control investigations into pharma-
ceuticals in the human health industry. 
1.5 Structure 
The thesis is structured to begin from a more general perspective on market defi-
nition, gradually moving to a more specific one. The study is divided into four 
parts. Firstly, the introduction describes the connection between innovation and 
mergers and explains the role of market definition in protecting competition in 
innovation. Next is an overview of the principles for defining relevant product 
markets for finished dose pharmaceuticals. This will give an understanding on 
what considerations are important in assessing pharmaceutical products as compe-
tition in innovation is also present on existing markets. The third chapter focuses 
entirely on how to define products on innovation markets. This chapter also in-
cludes an overview of Commission assessment in the Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline 
Oncology Business merger decision in which the Commission analysed the role of 
                                                 
17
 Sanofi-Aventis/Genzyme (Case COMP/M.5999) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C226/2, para 
11. See also Johnson & Johnson/Johnson & Johnson MSD Europe (Case COMP/M.3394) Com-
mission Decision [2004] OJ C 111/9; Novartis/Hexal (Case COMP/M.3751) Commission Deci-
sion [2005]; Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva (Case COMP/M.5253) Commission Decision [2009] OJ 
C66/24; Eli Lilly/Novartis Animal Health (Case COMP/M.7277) Commission Decision [2014] OJ 
C8/2, para 8. 
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R&D efforts on both existing markets as well as keeping the future in mind. The 
final chapter provides a conclusive analysis on the topic. 
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2 Market definition 
2.1 Principles of market definition 
2.1.1 General principles 
The EU Courts have confirmed that ‘(…) a proper definition of the relevant mar-
ket is a necessary precondition for any assessment of the effect of a concentration 
on competition.’18 In fact, relevant market definition is the first necessary step in 
any competition law analysis as it determines the scope of the analysis and, as 
explained before, has a major influence over the result.
19
  
The methodology of defining the relevant market and the concept of relevant 
market definition can be found in the Notice on the definition of the relevant mar-
ket. The relevant product market is defined as comprising of all products and/or 
services, which can be seen as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer 
depending on the characteristics, price and intended usage of the products.
 20
 The 
Notice distinguishes three key sources of competitive constraints – demand substi-
tutability, supply substitutability and potential competition.
21
 
Demand substitutability is measured by cross-price elasticity or the responsive-
ness of the quantity demand for a certain product to changes in the price of anoth-
er product.
22
 The assessment of demand substitution entails the determination of 
the product, which the consumer considers as substitutes, and the readiness to 
switch between them. This can be estimated through the hypothetical monopolist 
or SSNIP test, which assesses whether a 5-10%, permanent price increase results 
                                                 
18
 Case C–68/94 and C–30/95 France and Société commerciale des potasses and de l'azote and 
Entreprise minière and chimique v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, para 143 
19
 Sally Shorthose (ed), Guide to EU Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law (3
rd
 edn, Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2012) 557 
20
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purpose of Community competi-
tion law [1997] OJ C 372/5 (Relevant Market Notice), para 7 
21
 Ibid 13 
22
 Ioannis Kokkoris and Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 6.14 
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in an unprofitable situation due to the increase of sales of substitutes. In that case, 
the goods belong to the same market.
23
 The SSNIP test is more efficient in merger 
cases compared with abuse of dominance cases, as the prevailing price is taken as 
a starting point, lessening the risk of a cellophane fallacy.
24
 
Supply-side substitutability can be taken into account when its effects are equiva-
lent to those of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy.
25
 
The third possible constraint, potential competition, is only carried out after defin-
ing the market and when the positions of companies on the relevant market have 
been ascertained and give rise to completion concerns.
26
 
Nevertheless, when no competition concerns arise even if the market was hypo-
thetically defined in the strictest manner, the merger procedure is not based on 
market definition.
27
 
2.1.2 Pharmaceutical market specification 
The general principles of definition of a relevant product market listed in the No-
tice are not sufficient for all sectors. The pharmaceutical market is divergent 
mainly due to three major differences: 
First, the price of prescription drugs is often regulated as many national markets 
are in the form of a monopsony of the Government as the single buyer. In such 
cases, pharmaceutical companies cannot freely set prices, and especially cannot 
increase them over time despite the profitability of such actions.
28
 These firms 
may, however, decrease prices in response to strong competition.
29
 
                                                 
23
 Relevant Market Notice, paras 15-17 
24
 Kokkoris and Shelanski, 6.17 
25
 Relevant Market Notice, para 20 
26
 Ibid, para 24 
27
 Leigh Hancher and Wolf Sauter, EU Competition and Internal Market Law in the Health Care 
Sector (Oxford University Press 2012) 8.71 
28
 Case C–468/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia [2008] ECR I-7139, para 59 
29
 Jacob Westin ‘Defining Relevant Market in the Pharmaceutical Sector in the Light of the Losec-
case – Just How Different is the Pharmaceutical Market?’ [2011] 32(2) ECLR 57; Andrea Cos-
celli, Alan Overd ‘Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Sector’ 28 (5) [2007] ECLR 294 
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Secondly, the most important decision maker in the choice of medicines that any 
given patient needs is their doctor.
30
 The ultimate consumer also very often differs 
from the payer, which is to say the national insurance service or a private health 
insurance provider.
31
 Therefore, price usually plays a limited role in consumer 
decision-making.
32
 
Thirdly, originator pharmaceutical companies compete in innovation and invest-
ment in R&D to bring new, patented products on the market. Generics may enter 
the market only after patent expiry inducing price competition.
33
 
As competition in the pharmaceutical sector is based essentially on non-price 
grounds and there are restrictions on the freedom to price, many authors argue that 
the demand elasticity cannot be estimated.
 
Thus, the investigation in pharmaceuti-
cal sector should be based on more sector specific criteria and less focused on the 
SSNIP test and other price-related grounds for analysis.
34
 
2.2 Approved drugs 
2.2.1 ATC classification 
The Commission usually subdivides pharmaceuticals according to the ATC classi-
fication devised by EphMRA and maintained by EphMRA and IMS.
35
 The ATC 
classification has 16 categories,
36
 each with four levels from the most generic to 
                                                 
30
 Howard Morse ‘Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry’ 71 [2003] Antitrust 
Law Journal 661-662  
31
 Case C–501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] I-
9291, para 45; Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, Wouter Devroe ‘Astrazeneca: Court of Justice 
Upholds First Decision Finding Abuse of Dominant Position in Pharmaceutical Sector’ 4(3) 
[2013] Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 230, 
32
 Westin 57; Coscelli and Overd 294 
33
 Josef Drexl ‘Anticompetitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting 
Competition in Innovation without a Market’ 8(3) [2012] Journal of Competition Law & Econom-
ics 511 
34
 Coscelli and Overd 294-295; Westin 57-58, Sangin Park ‘Market Power in Competition for the 
Market’ [2009] 5(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 571, 578 
35
 Watson/Actavis (Case COMP/M.6613) Commission Decision [2012] OJ C180/11, para 6; Pfiz-
er/Wyeth (Case COMP/M.5476) Commission Decision [2009] OJ 262/1, p 15 
36
 Pfizer/Wyeth, para 15 
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the most specific.
37
 The third level of the ATC classification (ATC3) groups 
pharmaceuticals in terms of their therapeutic indication and is generally used as 
the starting point for the definition of relevant product markets
38
 in competition 
cases, in particular for competition between innovator companies.
 39
 
In some cases, pharmaceuticals need to be assessed at a higher, lower or mixed 
level or further subdivided.
40
 Moreover, in recent cases involving generic compa-
nies a narrower market definition has been systematically used – the ATC4 level, 
the exact same molecule or API level or based on a group of molecules
41
. The 
need for a narrower definition in competition with generic medicines stems from 
the fact that these drugs can normally be viewed as the closest substitute to origi-
nator drugs.
42
 The definition based on molecule level is particularly important 
when: 
1)  Doctors may, or are required to, prescribe medicines using the interna-
tional non-proprietary name of the molecule 
2)  the reimbursement is based on the price of a generic version of the origi-
nator medicine or 
3) pharmacies may, or are required to, offer the patient the opportunity to 
substitute an originator medicine with a generic equivalent.
43
 
2.2.2 Different galenic forms 
Since the Sanofi-Aventis/Zentiva decision in 2009, the Commission in its deci-
sions
44
 has differentiated medicines not only by their active ingredient(s), but also 
                                                 
37
 Takeda/Nycomed (Case COMP/M.6278) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C240/1, para 9; 
EphMRA /PBIRG Classification Committee, ‘Who we are What we do 2015’ (2015) 
<http://www.ephmra.org/user_uploads/ephmra%20who%20we%20are%202015%20final.pdf> 
accessed 5 April 2015, para 6 
38
 Pfizer/Wyeth, para 15, Reckitt Benckiser/Boots Healthcare International (Case COMP/M.4007) 
Commission Decision [2006] OJ C92/12, para 9 
39
 Pfizer/Wyeth, para.15. 
40
 Reckitt Benckiser/Boots Healthcare International, para 9 
41
 Teva/Ratiopharm (Case COMP M.5865) Commission decision [2010] OJ C7/5, para 12; Wat-
son/Actavis (Case COMP/M.6613) Commission Decision [2012] OJ C180/11, para 7 
42
 Teva/Ratiopharm, paras 12, 17 
43
 Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva (Case COMP/M.5253) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C66/24, para 18 
44
 Valeant Pharmaceuticals International/Bausch & Lomb Holdings (Case COMP/M.6969) Com-
mission Decision [2013] OJ C247/1, paras 16-17; Novartis/Alcon (Case COMP/M.5778) Commis-
sion Decision [2010] OJ C20/8, para 16; Galenica/Fresenius Medical Care/Vifor Fresenius Medi-
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by their galenic form as recognized by the European regulatory framework for 
medicines for human use, by their posology, pharmaceutical form and method and 
route of administration, which may limit their substitutability.
45
  
The route of administration and pharmaceutical form is sometimes, but not al-
ways, reflected in the ATC product categorisation.
46
 For a single galenic form or a 
small group of closely related galenic forms, the Commission begins to define the 
relevant product market by first identifying the active ingredient and only then the 
galenic form. The Commission is of the view that the correct market definition is 
most likely to consider possible distinctions between different galenic forms.
47
  
The dosage and form of a pharmaceutical are not always interchangeable, espe-
cially in paediatrics. Some forms of medicine, especially OTC medicines, can be 
substituted when they pursue convenience rather than medical benefits.
48
 Differ-
ent galenic forms are not considered to exist on the same relevant product market 
merely due to supply- side substitutability. The effects of such substitutability are 
not equivalent to those of demand substitution regarding effectiveness and imme-
diacy as the development of new galenic forms of an existing generic medicine 
generally takes two to three years or longer. The Commission has found that cer-
tain common galenic forms are generally not found to be substitutable on either 
the demand or the supply side. These include as oral syrups, tablets, rectal forms, 
injectable forms and parental forms. Different forms serve the needs of different 
types of patients, such as children, patients with the risk of vomiting etc, although 
this distinction must be confirmed on a case-by-case basis.
49
 
                                                                                                                                     
cal Care Renal Pharma Jv (Case COMP/M.6091) Commission Decision [2011] OJ C 33/3, para 
19  
45
 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2001] OJ L 311, arts 9, 11. 
46
 Merck/Schering-Plough (Case COMP/ M.5502) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C13/10, para 
46 
47
 Teva/Ratiopharm, paras 20-21 
48
 Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva, para 129, Teva/Ratiopharm, para 17  
49
 Teva/Ratiopharm, paras 18-19 
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2.2.3 Prescription v. OTC drugs 
The Commission also separates between prescription only ("Rx") and over-the-
counter ("OTC") drugs.
50
 The division between those categories stems from the 
differences in medical indications, side effects, legal framework, distribution and 
marketing. Usually consumers choose and purchase OTC drugs themselves and 
therefore these drugs are advertised to the general public. As mentioned before, 
the choice of prescription drugs is made by a doctor and the price is often reim-
bursed to the patient, therefore the marketing of the pharmaceutical is targeted at 
the prescriber.
51
  
Products available OTC that are reimbursable when bought on prescription exist 
on the same market. This could be the case depending on the defined conditions 
of the patient, for example drugs exclusively for patients such as children or preg-
nant/breastfeeding women, or when some of the same brand name drugs are sold 
OTC while others Rx depending on the packaging size, dosage or galenic form.
 52 
In the latter case, the patients might prefer to buy the medicine on their own ex-
pense depending on the price of the OTC to avoid the inconvenience of obtaining 
a prescription for a reimbursable alternative.
53
  
2.2.4 Originator v. generic drugs 
Even though the Commission has admitted that there could be differences in the 
demand for originator and generic pharmaceuticals, even when they are bioequiv-
alent,
54
 they are still found to exist on the same product market as the aim of ge-
nerics is to compete with originators.
55
 Generics are usually less expensive ver-
sions of originator drugs and the producers need to demonstrate that the generic 
version has identical quality and purity and that it is bioequivalent to the origina-
                                                 
50
 Watson/Actavis (Case COMP/M.6613) Commission Decision [2012] OJ C180/11, p.10, 
Teva/Ratiopharm, para 22; Novartis/Alcon, paras 12-14; Abbott/Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Case 
COMP/M.5661) Commission Decision [2010] OJ C89/1, para 11 
51
 Pfizer/Wyeth, para 17, Merck/Schering-Plough, para 13 
52
 Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva, paras 22-23 
53
 Teva/Ratiopharm, para 23 
54
 Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva, para 26, Teva/Ratiopharm, para 26 
55
 Watson/Actavis, para 12 
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tor drug to receive approval.
56
 After patent expiry, originators tend to lose market 
share to generics unless the price is reduced. Substitution is especially efficient if 
the regulatory system encourages switching
57
 and therefore a merger can cause a 
significant loss of competition where the producer of an originator acquires a sig-
nificant or sole producer of its generic equivalent on the market.
58
 For this reason, 
the distinction between originator drugs and generics is taken into account when 
assessing the closeness of competition in the markets investigated.
59
  
2.2.5 Biopharmaceutical products v. synthetic 
drugs 
The Commission has made a distinction in product market definition between 
biological medicinal products and small molecule chemical drugs.
60
 ‘Biological 
medicinal products are medicines whose active substance is made by or derived 
from living organisms (e.g. immunological products and medicines derived from 
human blood and plasma).’61 Biopharmaceutical products also include biosimi-
lars. The market for biosimilars has not been around for long as the first biosimi-
lars – growth hormones – were launched in Europe in 2006 following the adop-
tion of regulatory guidance on the approval of biosimilar products at the EU lev-
el.
62
 Biosimilar drugs are new versions of originator biopharmaceutical drugs with 
an identical therapeutic mechanism and clinical attributes. Unlike the small mole-
cule generics, also known as synthetic generics as they are produced by chemical 
synthesis, biosimilars are not exact copies of the originator pharmaceuticals. The 
                                                 
56
 Teva/Ratiopharm, para 25, Sanofi Aventis/Zentiva, para 25 
57
 Valeant Pharmaceuticals International/Bausch & Lomb Holdings (Case COMP/M.6969) Com-
mission Decision [2013] OJ C247/1, para 14; Novartis/Alcon (Case COMP/M.5778) Commission 
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active ingredient of a biosimilar, due to its manufacturing process, is never exactly 
the same as the biological originator product and is subject to significantly more 
complex and costly R&D and regulatory approval processes.
63
 The R&D process 
of a biosimilar is more similar to the R&D of originator drugs rather than synthet-
ic generics as it requires clinical trials and takes considerably longer time from 
development to marketing with a higher risk of failure of R&D.
64
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3 Relevant market for future 
products 
3.1 Future products 
Pharmaceutical firms are under heavy pressure to undertake significant R&D. 
New innovative products and having promising research and pipeline allow phar-
maceutical firms to face competition with less vulnerability.
65
 Large pharmaceuti-
cal companies depend on the profitability of a small number of products and the 
portfolio of patents on their new products. 
R&D can be carried out in-house by the pharmaceutical firms themselves or by 
academic or commercial laboratories.
66
 While ideas for new products are often 
bought in, the R&D projects are executed by very large pharmaceuticals, which 
have the resources to bring the innovative products to market.
67
 The investments 
needed for R&D can only be financed if a company can obtain the necessary 
funds during the relevant period of patent protection of the product development, 
thus it is necessary to launch new products on the markets of large industrialised 
countries as quickly as possible.
68
 Unlike other new-market economies that are led 
by innovation and significant investments in R&D, such as telecommunications or 
internet-based businesses, the pharmaceutical industry largely lacks network ef-
fects based on technical compatibility. Therefore, the industry cannot be charac-
terised by "quick and frequent entry and exit."
69
 One of the ways companies se-
cure a stream of new products is to increase in size and combine drug portfolios 
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through M&A.
70
 According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines such mergers 
also bring about pressure on competitive companies to innovate.
71
  
Pipeline products are products, which are at an advanced stage of development, 
but are not yet on the market.
72
 After a pipeline drug has been successful at pre-
clinical trials, an application is filed with relevant national authorities in Europe to 
begin clinical trials. R&D projects undergo three different phases of clinical test-
ing on humans. The Commission refers to the statements by the parties in the 
GibaGeigy/Sandoz
73
 decision when talking about success rates of clinical trials. 
Phase I starts eight to ten years before a product is marketed and generally have 
no more than a 10% rate of success. Phase II starts four to five years before the 
product is marketed and has a success-rate of ~30%. Phase III involves testing the 
medicines on patients in clinics and hospitals, usually in multiple different coun-
tries and aims to confirm the efficacy and safety of the test compound versus pla-
cebo and/or standard of care for a given disease. Phase III, which starts three years 
before the marketing of the product, has a failure-rate of over 50%.
74
 Therefore, 
potential competition by pipeline products is already regarded as actual competi-
tion to an extent as pipeline products that are in phase III or beyond are already in 
use.
75
 
While pharmaceutical mergers incentivise competitors to make R&D efforts, a 
merger between innovators may impede effective competition. The Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines brings examples of major innovators with pipeline products 
related to a specific product market seeking to merge and a firm with relatively 
small market share but promising pipeline products.76 Regarding pipeline products, 
the Commission looks at the R&D efforts in terms of both existing and future 
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market situations. Unless the future products intend to replace existing products, 
the relevant market for these products cannot be defined in the same way as exist-
ing products.
77
 In addition to assessing the effects of the merger on the existing 
and potential product market, the Commission does indeed take into account 
competition in innovation as well.
78
  
The Commission has considered that products in R&D could be relevant for the 
assessment of the competitive situation on both the existing product market and 
on possible future markets.
79
 Therefore, the Commission assesses situations where 
there are a) actual overlaps between existing products, b) potential overlaps be-
tween existing products and R&D projects in Phase III (market-to-pipeline) and c) 
potential overlaps between the merging companies R&D projects in Phase II 
(pipeline-to-pipeline).
80
  
The potential overlaps involving pipeline drugs about to enter into competition 
with other products which are either on the market or at the development stage are 
assessed based on identifying the ATC3 category, by reference to their character-
istics and intended therapeutic use, in which the relevant pipeline product would 
most likely fall upon release.
81
 In relation to the importance of R&D for future 
markets, the relevant product market definition can be less clear-cut than for exist-
ing products and left open and is based either on existing ATC classes or primari-
ly by the characteristics and indications to which the future products are to be ap-
plied.
82
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3.2 Competition in innovation 
Competing R&D poles are defined as ‘R&D efforts directed towards a certain 
new product or technology, and the substitutes for that R&D, that is to say, R&D 
aimed at developing substitutable products or technology for those developed by 
the co-operation and having similar timing’83 
The Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, which also applies in the 
field of mergers,
 84
 includes the concept of competition in innovation or R&D ef-
forts. Competition concerns may arise when the merger takes place between inno-
vators currently developing new products or technologies ‘which either may – if 
emerging – one day replace existing ones or which are being developed for a new 
intended use and will therefore not replace existing products but create a com-
pletely new demand.’ These Guidelines distinguish two scenarios depending in 
the nature of innovation in the industries.
85
 
The latter scenario includes innovative efforts in an industry where R&D poles 
cannot be identified and thus the Commission will try to avoid assessing the im-
pact of the R&D on innovation and focus on existing markets related to the 
R&D.
86
  
In the former scenario, the process of innovation is structured so that competing 
R&D poles are identifiable at an early stage. The aim of the assessment is to ana-
lyse whether there will be a sufficient number of remaining R&D poles left on the 
market after the agreement. The Commission starts with analysing the R&D of the 
parties, followed by identifying credible competing R&D poles. The aspects con-
sidered for the assessment of the credibility of competing poles include the nature, 
scope and size of any other R&D efforts, their access to financial and human re-
sources, know-how/patents, or other specialised assets as well as their timing and 
their capability to exploit possible results. R&D poles that cannot be seen as close 
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substitutes, due to access to resources or timing for example, cannot be regarded 
as credible competitors. In addition to changes in innovation market, a new prod-
uct market could also be affected. Even though this market does not yet exist as 
such, the analysis of it can often implicitly be incorporated in the competition in 
innovation analysis. This scenario is typical to the pharmaceutical industry
 87
 
 
Figure 1: Assessment process of competition in innovation according to 
Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements 
The wording of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
88
 covers competition from po-
tential rivals about to enter a market but also allows a preview of the future mar-
ket situation as a result of current R&D potential and leaves the Commission wide 
discretion in assessing mergers in innovation markets.
89
 The Commission has 
primarily focused on the “future market” approach i.e. focused exclusively on the 
protection of competition on future product market.
90
  
The Commission also looks on the effects of mergers on R&D and innovation as 
innovation is seen as a beneficial by-product of effective competition to consum-
ers, similar to a low price or high quality of products.
91
 Considering efficiencies, 
the Commission takes into account consumer welfare as long as it does not form 
an obstacle to competition.
92
 The priority is short-term welfare, even though the 
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Commission may accept a long-term consumer welfare standard in exceptional 
cases.
93
  
The reduction of competition in innovation, on the other hand, will reduce the 
number of new products within the same market, leading to negative consequenc-
es for both patients and healthcare providers. The future products would be, to a 
significant extent, demand substitutes and the results of lessening competition are 
higher prices for patients and healthcare systems. Moreover, a reduced number of 
differentiated products in future markets in terms of tolerability and safety profile 
leads to less variety of choices available to match the needs of patients.
94
 
3.3 Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology 
Business merger 
In 2014 Novartis and GSK signed an agreement according to which Novartis 
would acquire sole control over GSK’s portfolio of oncology pharmaceutical 
products composed of ten marketed products and two pipeline products for the 
treatment of advanced cancers.
95
  
The Commission used the definition for the R&D efforts set out in the Guidelines 
on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
96
 – clinical research programmes are 
competing when they are aimed at developing substitutable products and have 
similar timing. Whether these future products could potentially substitute each 
other was assessed by reference to 
1) the products' characteristics together with the intended therapeutic use, in 
particular, by reference to their mechanism of action 
2)  the cancer types the products aimed to treat.  
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In assessing the timing, the Commission used the Phases of the clinical trials as 
reference points.
 97
 
The overview of the Competition’s line of investigation and considerations in de-
fining the market is only given regarding the treatment for advanced melanoma 
and ovarian cancer and in the field regarding competition between pipeline drugs 
in future markets. While there were more markets involved, the Commission 
found no competition concerns in those markets and left the definition thus open. 
3.3.1 Advanced melanoma 
Novartis had a B-Raf inhibitor and a MEK inhibitor in Phase III clinical trials for 
the treatment of advanced melanoma, which were also in Phase III trials for com-
bined treatment.
98
 GSK had a B-Raf inhibitor and a MEK inhibitor approved as 
monotherapies for the treatment of advanced melanoma and was undergoing 
Phase III clinical trials for their use in combination.
99
 
This was the first time the Commission assessed the relevant product market defi-
nition for pharmaceuticals treating melanoma.
100
 In accordance with the Commis-
sion’s previous decisions on the product market definition for pipeline pharma-
ceuticals, it assessed whether the B-Raf and MEK inhibitors and immunotherapies 
belonged to the same product market.
101
 Both targeted therapies and immunother-
apies were new forms of cancer therapies. Immunotherapies support the immune 
system to increase its natural ability to fight cancer. B- Raf and MEK inhibitors 
are both used as targeted therapies which inhibit proteins which carry the signal 
for cells to reproduce. They are primarily used at advanced stages of the tumour 
with the aim of slowing down cancer progression and elongate the life of the pa-
tient.
102
 
The Commission used the pipeline products as the starting point for defining the 
relevant product market in accordance with previous case law, looking at the 
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characteristics of the future products and the indications to which they they will 
be applied.
103
 The market investigations showed that targeted and immunothera-
pies would be used in different settings depending on the mutation and aggression 
of the tumour. Likewise, the targeted therapies could not be substituted with 
chemotherapy.
104
 Therefore, the relevant product market was the market for tar-
geted therapies for the treatment of advanced melanoma but the further, more de-
tailed definition, was left open as the Commission had doubts of the compatibility 
of the transaction already at this stage.
105
 This market definition created three hor-
izontal overlaps within the market:
106
 
Table 2: Horizontal overlaps in Novartis/GSK Oncology merger in advanced melanoma market 
 B-Raf inhibi-
tors 
MEK inhibi-
tors 
B-Raf/MEK combination 
Novartis Phase III Phase III Phase III 
GSK Approved Approved Phase III 
In the competitive assessment for the advanced melanoma market, the Commis-
sion took into account that, according to the market investigation, the B-Raf and 
MEK inhibitors, particularly in combination, would become the standard care in 
treatment. The only competitor for the parties in the market was Roche holding a 
B-Raf inhibitor already on the market and B-Raf and MEK combination that has 
successfully completed III clinical trials – likely to be approved in EEA in 
2015.
107
 Furthermore, the market investigation showed that the merger would re-
duce potential credible competition for the use of B-RAF and MEK inhibitors as 
monotherapies as well as in combination as Roche would not exert competitive 
pressure on the post-merger entity. The Commission concluded that it is likely 
that Novartis will not launch their inhibitors as the Roche products are at a more 
advanced stage of trials, benefiting the GSK’s B-Raf and MEK combination and 
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thereby reducing the number of inhibitors that would available on the market 
without the transaction.
108
 
3.3.2 Ovarian cancer 
Both Novartis and GSK had MEK-inhibitor in Phase III clinical studies for the 
treatment of low-grade serous carcinoma, a rare type of ovarian cancer, while 
GSK also had an AKT inhibitor in Phase I/II clinical studies in combination with 
chemotherapy for the treatment of recurrent platinum-resistant ovarian cancer.
109
 
The Commission used a similar assessment for the definition of the market as for 
the advanced melanoma treatment and considered the product market for pipeline 
pharmaceutical as guided by the characteristics of the product and indications to 
which they apply.
110
 The Commission found potential pipeline-to-pipeline over-
laps in the treatment of ovarian low-grade serous carcinoma between the MEK-
inhibitors of the parties.
111
 
The parties requested that the GSK MEK-inhibitor be left out of assessment as the 
Phase III clinical trials for the treatment of the ovarian low-grade serous carcino-
ma were conducted in an Investigator Sponsored Study (ISS) sponsored by the 
National Cancer Institute, which is part of a US government agency and account-
able for all aspects of the study.
 112
 The Commission refused the request and used 
a hypothetical situation where the results of the ISS trials were positive and trial 
conditions answered to the European Medicines Agency requirements to file for 
registration, in which case, GSK could enter the market.
113
  
Similarly to the market for advanced melanoma treatment, the parties had only 
one competitor with a pipeline product in Phase II clinical studies. Consequently, 
the Commission again considered that there was a likely elimination of Novartis’ 
pipeline resulting in a loss of competitive pressure.
114
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3.3.3 Innovation in the MEK and B-Raf inhibitor.  
Both parties had ongoing Phase I and II clinical trials for MEK and B-Raf inhibi-
tors potential use either as monotherapies or in combination for a number of types 
of cancer. Novartis also had an ongoing Phase II clinical trial for the use of its 
MEK inhibitor in uveal melanoma.
115
 The Commission concluded that the ap-
proach set out in the Guidelines on horizontal Co-operation Agreements could be 
applied in order to define the market for this pipeline-to-pipeline situation.
116
  
According to the market investigation, the parties’ MEK and B-Raf inhibitors 
were based on the same mechanism of action, were expected to address similar 
presently unmet medical needs, were likely to identify the same cancer types and 
were at similar stages of clinical development. Thus, they were likely to be substi-
tutes to each other. Correspondingly to the findings for market definition for the 
treatment of advanced melanoma, research programmes based on immunothera-
pies were found rather complementary than competing. Consequently, the market 
was defined as development of MEK and B-Raf inhibitors for the treatment of 
colorectal cancer, non-small-cell lung carcinoma and advanced melanoma brain 
metastases.
 117 
Therefore, the Commission assessed whether there would be sufficient number of 
clinical research programmes left after the merger. As mentioned before, Roche 
had MEK and B-Raf inhibitors potentially competing with the parties’ MEK and 
B-Raf inhibitors as combined therapies – where there is more interest for competi-
tion than for monotherapies.
118
 The merger would combine under the same own-
ership two among three competing clinical trials based on MEK and B-Raf inhibi-
tors that aimed to serve the same unmet medical needs.
119
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Table 3: Competing R&D efforts based on the MEK and B-Raf inhibitors for the treatment of certain 
cancers 
 B-Raf inhibitor MEK inhibitor B-Raf/MEK combi-
nation 
Colorectal cancer 
Novartis Phase I/II Phase I/II - 
GSK - - Phase II 
Roche Phase II - - 
Non-small-cell lung carcinoma 
Novartis Phase II Phase II Phase II 
GSK Phase II - Phase II 
Melanoma brain metastases 
Novartis - - Phase II 
GSK Phase II - Phase II 
Uveal melanoma 
Novartis - Phase III - 
The Commission considered that the parties’ incentive to invest in their R&D 
programmes, driven by future sales, would be curtailed. Post-merger investment 
in one of the clinical research programmes would cannibalise future sales of its 
other clinical research programme. The pharmaceutical products based on differ-
ent active principal ingredients differentiate to some extent, for example in terms 
of tolerability and safety for certain groups of patients. The trials to identify these 
differences is a common practice in oncology clinical research as part of sales 
strategy and could still provide some incentive to develop two parallel research 
programmes if the differentiation would compensate and reward the incremental 
cost of running the clinical research programme. The sales of the competing, par-
allel developed, product would still decrease as a result. Therefore, there was a 
likelihood of reduced innovation post-merger due to the lack of competition and 
 
30 
incentive to invest in both MEK and B-Raf clinical research programmes in paral-
lel.
120
 
Due to the degree of uncertainty in pharmaceutical R&D, it is likely that products 
at a more advanced stage of research would be preferred. As GSK’s products are 
on the market for the treatment of advanced melanoma, it likely that the pair will 
also be prioritised in development for other types of cancer, potentially leading to 
the abandonment for Novartis’ products. The market investigation showed that the 
B-Raf and MEK inhibitors, especially combined, would have significant im-
portance in cancer treatment in the future. The abandonment of Novartis’ clinical 
trials also meant the end of clinical trials for the treatment of various, sometimes 
even rare cancers, such as uveal melanoma. Even if clinical research for these 
cancers were to be launched for GSK products, there would be a substantial delay 
due to the time necessary for designing and completing completely new clinical 
trials. Thus, the variety of MEK and B-Raf therapies and therefore competition 
would possibly be restricted.
121
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4 Conclusion 
A correct market definition might reveal a situation where the pipeline drugs over-
lap with either products that are already on the market or other future products. 
Just like a merger between firms with competing existing products might cause 
competition concerns, it can have an impeding effect on competition between 
R&D research programmes. The purpose of mergers involving innovators could 
be either to acquire new research programmes or to reinforce market power. The 
concern for future innovation becomes even greater when the fact, that so far stud-
ies have not shown mergers to have any actual positive influence on innovation, 
nor to produce incentives for other companies to innovate, is taken into ac-
count.
122
 This means that despite the theory that mergers between innovators serve 
the incentivising role for competitors to initiate new R&D efforts, there is a higher 
likelihood of loss of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Therefore, from 
competition perspective, a relevant product market definition, which reflects the 
actual market situation, plays a key role in assessing the potential outcomes re-
garding both competition and innovation. 
The main concept the Commission uses for relevant product market definition is 
demand substitutability. The R&D poles are examined for the purpose of defining 
the market in two occasions. In the first situation, the R&D efforts aim to signifi-
cantly change existing products or to replace them. In this case, the market should 
be easier to define, mainly, because there is a product on the market, which the 
pipeline product substitutability can be compared to. The nature of this circum-
stance calls for a narrow product market definition. Based on the developments on 
the definition of a relevant product market for finished dose pharmaceuticals, it is 
likely that also the pipeline drugs will be more strictly assessed in order to be able 
to compare them. The evidence of this progress is most clear regarding pipeline 
generic drugs where the Commission already divides the relevant ATC3 classes to 
molecular level when possible and takes the mode of administration into ac-
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count.
123
 This could be seen as equivalent to differentiating between finished dose 
pharmaceuticals depending on their galenic form.  
As can be illustrated by the Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business deci-
sion, the market definition begins with defining the disease that the drug is meant 
to treat. While the B-Raf and MEK inhibitors were both used, either separately or 
in combination for cancer treatment, the Commission assessed different cancer 
types as the basis of different markets. From there on, the Commission examined 
which treatments for those cancers are substitutable regarding indications to 
which they will be applied. The Commission also took into account pipeline drugs 
which are not in clinical trials in Europe, but are elsewhere. While the Commis-
sion explained the decision to consider these trials in their assessment by the fact 
that in principle, if the trials conditions correspond to European Medicines Agen-
cy requirements, it is possible file for drug registration also in Europe, the inclu-
sion is also in conformity with the presumption that R&D is global. 
In the second case, the competition in the market will happen in the future. The 
Commission assesses these situations by with the aim of protecting competition 
on future markets and protecting future innovation. That is, the Commission con-
siders whether the merger will result in loss of competition on the future relevant 
product market and whether enough R&D poles will remain. Identification of 
R&D poles and the assessment of the impact of a merger on innovation is the key 
to relevant market definition according to the Guidelines to Horizontal Coopera-
tion Agreements.  
Defining the relevant product market for products that do not exist yet is a lot 
more difficult, yet important task. Not only is the assessment based on predictions 
on the future importance of the product on the market, there might not exist a suit-
able ATC class which would provide a reference point for the definition. Thus, 
the relevant product market for competing future products cannot be as precise as 
it is in case of market-to-pipeline overlaps. 
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The step-by-step logic of the Commission for the relevant product market defini-
tion for future products derived from the Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology 
Business decision consists of three steps: 
1) Determening the mode of action 
2) Indentifying the scope of application 
3) Determining the stage of clinical development. 
The accuracy of relevant product market definitions determines the range of prod-
ucts and the position of companies operating on the market in the future. The va-
riety of products offers a choice to consumers depending on their specific needs 
and preferences while the competition in the market exerts pressure on pricing. 
These benefits accompany effective competition regardless of whether the pipe-
line drugs will compete with existing or other future products. Even though defin-
ing the relevant market precedes competitive analysis, possible competition con-
cerns should already be taken into account at this stage of the assessment. 
The Commission begins defining the market on a rather general level, the thera-
peutic use, and in recent years, the relevant product market has been defined more 
and more stringently. The process of defining the market ends, as also demon-
strated in the Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business decision, as soon as 
competition concerns arise. The practicality of a narrow market definition has 
already raised doubts among legal scholars and practitioners as it suggest that any 
pharmaceutical with novel biochemical action protected by patent is likely to be 
considered possessing market power, which discourages innovation.
124
 These 
concerns were first raised after European Court of Justice confirmed the Commis-
sions finding that H2 blockers and PPIs do not belong to the same market despite 
having the same therapeutic use, but different biochemical mode of action.
125
 
Pharmaceuticals with the same or similar therapeutic use aim to treat the same 
medical problems. Taking the market definition to a mode of action, or to an even 
further level, means that every future product with an innovative mode of action 
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or molecule is creating its own new market. This indicates market power even if 
there are already existing treatments for the same medical needs, which could 
even be preferable from the viewpoint of medical practitioners or patients. In the 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business decision, the Commission also re-
garded mode of action as basis for the assessment of which future products com-
pete in innovation. The B-Raf and MEK inhibitors were found to exist on the 
same future market even though the trials, with the exception of uveal melanoma, 
were only in either Phase I or Phase II trials.
126
 It is important to bear in mind that 
the prognosis for the success of R&D efforts even at Phase III trials is gloomy as 
less than half of these products will eventually be launched onto the market. In 
addition to the likelihood of the failure of clinical trials, the possible substitutabil-
ity is only revealed during the end-phase of the trials or when the product is actu-
ally in use in the market. 
The amount of R&D poles on the market play a significant role on the assessment 
of competition in such markets. It is important to protect R&D efforts from being 
eliminated as a competition strategy and therefore the assessment of competition 
in innovation cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, the realistic predictions on which 
products would be competing on the market in the future should be taken into 
account. With a success rate of approximately 30%, pipeline drugs in Phase II will 
probably never be launched and compete with each other on actual market. In the 
end, recognising the uncertainty surrounding R&D poles concerning their future 
use and chances of success, turning back to future product market definition based 
on therapeutic use and considering only those pipeline drugs that have reached 
Phase III trials might reflect the actual competitive situation better. 
Excluding programmes in Phase I and Phase II trials may also raise competition 
concerns. Both Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines acknowledge 
that the effects of innovation on the market may not be reflected in the market 
shares in relation to calculating HHI.
127
 Nevertheless, the market shares of inno-
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vating biotech companies or other commercial labs may not be sufficient to result 
in a post-merger HHI above 1000, which is likely to exclude the finding of com-
petition concerns by the Commission.  It is therefore understandable why the 
Commission decided to take research programmes in an early stage into account 
in market definition. 
It is difficult to assess which relevant product market definition protects the mar-
ket most efficiently. On one hand, the Commission has chosen to narrow down 
the variety of products on future markets according to their chemical composition 
or mode of action while on the other, broadened it by taking into consideration 
research programmes in an earlier stage of research. The purpose of such consid-
erations is probably to find balance and avoid defining the relevant product mar-
ket either too broad or narrow. It is easier to assess the impact of narrowing down 
the definition regarding characteristics of the chemical compound according to 
their use in treatment. It is probably almost impossible to predict whether broad-
ening the amount of clinical trial phase would have a remarkable desired effect of 
broadening the variety of products on the future market due to the uncertainty of 
the success of R&D efforts. 
The Commission has recently been in scrutinizing reverse payment settlements 
that block or delay the launch of generic drugs onto the market.
128
 A similar result 
can be achieved through mergers which, moreover, can be preferable from an 
economic perspective to entry deterrence.
129
 The discontinuation of a R&D pro-
gramme is a likely outcome when the merging parties’ existing or future products 
could be seen as substitutes to each other, thus, lessening competition in innova-
tion and on future markets. In connection with reverse payment settlements, addi-
tionally to finding subsequent breaches of Article 101 TFEU, the Commission has 
also pursued scrutiny under article 102 TFEU.
130
 Theoretically, the Commission 
could also apply article 102 TFEU in merger cases. Both merger control and arti-
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cle 102 TFEU cover the concept of dominance, the first ex ante and the latter ex 
post. It is already the task of merger control to avoid the creation or enhancement 
of dominant position, which would impede effective competition. The application 
of article 102 TFEU to subsequent mergers would mean that ex ante assessment 
of these mergers has failed. Such situation could be a result of a too broad market 
definition, which had not reflected actual competitive situation. While the applica-
tion of article 102 TFEU is possible, it is more likely that the Commission prefers 
to narrow down market definitions to avoid the necessity of remedying the situa-
tion. 
Overall, relevant market definition should not be viewed in isolation. Because the 
relevant market definition is of decisive importance to the result of the assessment 
and as to whether a merger will or will not be approved on certain conditions, it is 
not possible to start defining the market without thinking ahead. The possible ef-
fects of the merger on competition on future markets and in innovation should be 
taken into account from the very beginning. 
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